The Rise and Fall of the Nebraska Football Dynasty - Part 6

The Fall Conclusion

Charlie McBride - Nebraska Football Defensive Coordinator / Huskers.com

Sixth and final article in a series by Husker fan Chris Fort. | Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5

Strength & Conditioning

And what of Nebraska’s strength program, an institution so well-respected that even California kids like Brenden Stai grew up with Husker weightlifting posters on their high school gym walls. The all-everything recruit Curt Dukes shined a light on the Huskers struggles in a 2004 interview with the Omaha World-Herald. “I got weaker out there. Coming out of high school, I was really excited. I thought, 'I'm going to Nebraska. I'm going to be a lot faster and quicker and stronger.' I didn't see the results at all[1].”

Evidence of a waning weight room can be seen in the loss in development of the walk-ons, the offensive line being the position players have the greatest opportunity to be “made.” Walk-ons Greg Orton and Adam Treu were two who started on the line and then played in the NFL, but success stories were harder to come by after 2001.

Some attribute Nebraska’s fall in S&C to their facilities declining. Program investment in football meant building shiny new weight rooms and Nebraska quickly fell behind competitors itching for success. Arizona State built such an impressive facility compared to the Huskers that in the early 2000s, they snagged a prized O-Line recruit away from Nebraska due to their superior set-up[2]. It was such a surprise, a Pac-10 school beating out “Offensive Lineman U,” that Sports Illustrated made note of it. “The cathedral of muscle does wonders for recruiting.”

Epley created the most advanced system in college football. But innovation only lasts so long before it becomes commonplace. And by the early 2000s, Nebraska lost its size and strength advantage, as ominously forecasted by a 2002 preview of the Huskers: “the Big 12 has caught up with the Huskers with the massive size of its conference linemen. Nebraska isn't going to be able to just line up and pound the football as easily as it has in the past.” Epley echoed this sentiment prior to the 2002 season, noting that schools like Texas and Oklahoma had “closed the gap considerably” on the Huskers strength advantage. The Husker’s line play subsequently suffered. No longer were they able to knock their opponents off the line of scrimmage with impunity. By the time the 2002 season started, the unthinkable was occurring: Nebraska – universally known for elite line play - was getting beat in the trenches.

Style of Play

That was particularly problematic when considering the Huskers relied on dominance along the lines with their offense.

The fall of the Huskers is often attributed to their style of offense. After the Huskers lost to Iowa State in 2002, fatally knocking them from their still-record-long perch in the AP poll, Sports Illustrated writer Stewart Mandel wrote: “The old-fashioned, option-based system that’s been their
signature for so many years is now, in this age of wide-open offenses and complex defensive schemes, the source of their undoing.”

Certainly, Solich’s I-Formation offense had grown stale and predictable in a rapidly evolving environment that saw innovators like Mike Leach and Rich Rodriguez emerge. But had the triple option really been passed by in the college football landscape?

Like most offensive schemes, the option could be thwarted by superior speed on the opposing defense. But Doug Horwich, a writer for Huskers Illustrated.com in 2004, questioned whether the landscape of the sport had actually changed much since the mid-to-late 1990s when Nebraska’s offense dominated. “Are today’s defenses any faster than the Miami defense of 1994, which featured Ray Lewis and Warren Sapp, or the Florida defense that was manhandled in the 1996 Fiesta Bowl, or the Tennessee defense that was similarly abused in the 1998 Orange Bowl?”

As College Football News.com writer Pete Fiutak asserted: “The option didn't go away because it didn't work; the option went away because it was hard to get the top-shelf quarterbacks to run it.” That was certainly true of the Huskers, who regularly struck out with their top quarterback targets during Solich’s tenure. The Huskers failed to sign any quarterbacks in 1998, lost Crawford to baseball in 1999, struck out again in 2000, and quickly recruited marginal prospects in 2001 to stem the bleeding. It can be argued that the option – and other antiquated systems like the single wing – never really get run out of the sport; they just get abandoned by coaches who fear being labeled out-of-touch.

The option’s present viability can be seen in how it succeeds in today’s game, albeit in evolved forms. Tim Tebow won two national titles at Florida in the late 2000s running a spread option scheme.  West Virginia under Rich Rodriguez won two BCS bowls running a variation of the spread option during the same timeframe. Oregon under Chip Kelly made the zone read a staple of both college and professional offenses by the 2010s. And after an NCAA rule change in 2009, the run-pass-option (RPO) play became a key feature of many collegiate and professional offenses.

To those who still doubt the option’s efficacy, recall the 2011 Alabama Crimson Tide title team, who boasted perhaps the greatest collegiate defense of all time, ending the season as the first in nearly thirty years to lead the nation in all major defensive categories (total, rushing, passing, scoring). But even they gave up a season high 302 rushing yards and 21 points to then-FCS foe Georgia Southern, which ran the triple option. Alabama did not give up more than 20 points to any other ballclub in 2011.

A certain amount of modernization to meet the criteria of stretching defenses (see the Zone Read and RPO) was necessary and not attained. At Ohio State, Urban Meyer dominated the Big 10 in the 2010s with option and power run concepts borrowed from Tom Osborne but adapted to modern spread formations. Solich purportedly aspired to do something similar at the start of his head coaching tenure. But Bobby Newcombe’s injury in the opening stanza of 1998 derailed his rumored plan of converting to a spread attack and he never returned to it. That proved problematic, as
journalist Sam McKewon phrased it in 2007: “Against any reasonably good defense, [their I-Formation option] offense had run its course.” [3]

The same components of Nebraska’s offensive machine – power run, option, out physical your opponent – could still win in college football. But a retooling was necessary.

Continuity

How did the Huskers fall so far in recruiting, development and game planning post-Osborne? Recruiting is a job duty primarily handled by assistant coaches. And as UNL booster and respected business magnate David Sokol said, “Frank did not confide early enough to Tom that recruiting was sliding because some of those coaches had basically retired with Tom. He needed to make some changes but didn’t know how.”

Many coaches struggled in their roles as the years wore on them. Offensive Line coaching legend Milt Tenopir retired in 2002, reluctantly, citing health issues that hampered his ability to teach technique. Coach McBride had such bad physical ailments that he collected disability checks after his coaching career ended in 1999[4]. Younger assistants did not pick up the slack for those that were aging and ailing[5]. And true to Osborne’s statement regarding Prop 48, NU needed grinders on the recruiting trail to numb the advantages they lost.

Hiring from within also betrayed the Huskers. When McBride retired in 1999, Solich replaced him with assistant coach Craig Bohl. Bohl’s first defense in 2000 ranked a solid 26th nationally in scoring and total defense but ominously gave up more points, 19.4 per game, than any Husker defense since 1958. His second season as defensive coordinator oversaw the worst defensive performance in a generation when Nebraska visited Folsom field, as the Huskers yielded 62 points and 380 rushing yards to the surging Buffaloes. Colorado’s offensive coordinator, future Husker coach Shawn Watson, later revealed that a simple plan caused the catastrophe. Watson noticed that putting a receiver in motion would rotate Nebraska’s safeties toward said receiver, allowing the Buffs to run plays away from that side of the field.[6] Bohl never picked up on it, and the result was the end of the mystique the Huskers carried for decades.

Nebraska’ program eroded with its staff. But another aspect that coincided with Nebraska’s internal parts decaying was the emergence of their conference foes.

Oklahoma State came to life under coach Les Miles, as did Missouri under the direction of Gary Pinkel, both of whom were hired prior to the 2001 season. In 2002, Oklahoma State ended its losing streak of 36 consecutive games to Nebraska with a 24-21 win in Stillwater, while Missouri with Brad Smith ended Nebraska’s longstanding win streak of 25 games the very next year.

Bob Stoops revitalized a dormant Oklahoma program when he was hired in 1999, going on to win ten Big XII titles in eighteen seasons and amassing a five-and-two record against NU. Others had their moments in the sun. Kansas State decimated a previously unbeaten Oklahoma crew in the 2003 Big XII Title Game. Kansas won the Orange Bowl in 2007 under Mark Mangino, hired in 2002.

And finally, Colorado under Gary Barnett (hired in 1999), became a conference winner, nearly making the national title game in 2001 after their dismantling of Nebraska. Barnett was a hot coaching candidate after his miraculous turnaround at Northwestern in the mid-90s. After two tough-to-swallow losses to the Huskers in 99 and 00, the Buffs unleashed a decade’s worth of frustration out.

Less than three minutes into the 2001 contest, Colorado had a two-touchdown lead. Eighteen minutes in, the Buffs’ lead grew to 32. The Nebraska offense eventually woke up to score 36, but it was for naught. Colorado averaged 7.3 yards per carry against a defense that ranked 6th in the nation in total yards, 13th nationally against the rush. And Nebraska surrendered the most points any Husker outfit ever has in giving up 62. It was nothing less than shocking. 

On that dreary day in Boulder, the college football world saw that a bully could bleed. Chief among the laments over losing said mystique was the psychological advantage Nebraska lorded over opponents prior to the first whistle; teams expected to lose to Nebraska, and Nebraska expected to win. With the aura of invincibility smashed to smithereens in front of an astonished national audience, the floodgates of reformed expectations for Big Red were irrevocably opened. No longer was defeat a foregone conclusion. Now the psychological playing field was even and that further exposed the cracks in Nebraska’s once-impenetrable foundation.

Nebraska went on to play Miami in the Rose Bowl due to the BCS formula and were quickly stomped into the Pasadena grass by a far more talented Miami unit. The following year, Nebraska lost seven games, their most since the 1950s.

Culture

Many pointed to the Husker’s flagging locker room as a source of its demise. There can be no doubt that the crumbling of the machine started with Frank Solich taking over for well-respected legend, Tom Osborne. But perhaps one of the less discussed and far less evidential components of Nebraska’s demise is the loss of peer leadership. What could a handful of Frank’s coaches do, after all, when strength and conditioning requires hundreds of hours of unsupervised conditioning, arduous work that demands internal drive and direction. After the disappointing 1996 season, a season in which Nebraska lost two games and still nearly played for a national championship, senior captain Grant Wistrom commanded grueling voluntary workouts. “We weren't going to put up with a lot of the B.S. from last year, the lackadaisical attitudes and everything.” When Grant and fellow captain Jason Peter left after 1997, the Huskers often struggled to find leadership among its rosters. 

“I had Kevin Raemakers, John Parrella, Terry Conneally, Christian Peter, and Trev Alberts,” said Jason Peter in a 2009 interview. “I saw the way that they did things. [Then Nebraska star Ndaumkong] Suh hasn’t really had anybody like that.”[7]

Much could be gleaned from the 1999 campaign, Solich’s second as head coach, and one which brought uncharacteristic volatility that nearly derailed a conference championship season. Rumors swirled of locker room disagreements around who should be starting at quarterback. Eric Crouch briefly left the team during training camp, as Solich tagged Bobby Newcombe to start despite Crouch arguably winning the competition. Both starting I-Backs, DeAngelo Evans and Correll Buckhalter, quit the team, though Buckhalter later returned. Evans called Solich “classless” on his way out.

Frank’s handling of the situation no doubt informed how his players viewed him. But then, questionable handling of off-field matters is not an automatic death knell for a team or its culture. Much has been written about Urban Meyer and the controversial coddling of the star players he had at Florida. When asked how the team was still able to win, a former player simply replied, “We had better players.” Devaney himself was not above keeping certain players on the field in the interest of winning the game. But Nebraska no longer had the high-end caliber talent to overcome that in the early 2000s.

Dave Ellis recalled how in a 2000 tilt at Kansas State there weren’t enough capes to cover the players in a sleet storm. Ellis failed to convince those that weren’t playing to relinquish theirs for those that were actually on the field. “I had never experienced selfishness before. Never seen somebody not sacrifice and contribute to this team’s whole potential because they were too selfish,” Ellis said, calling it an iron anvil. Turns out it takes an anvil to dismantle a machine as strong as Nebraska’s.

When the machine breaks down, it’s hard to reignite it. The momentum has been lost. Everything that was once in alignment has to be reset from the beginning. The machine rusted and decayed and, ultimately, fell into a state of disrepair. Much like the twenty-year gap between World War Two and Devaney’s tenure, Nebraska’s program has proven difficult to rebuild.

Conclusion

“You won't see dominance like that again. There are no more Nebraska’s. Not even in Nebraska.”
-Tim Layden

Both the 1962 and 2001 campaigns ended in bowl games against Miami, one played in the snow of New York, the other played under the golden sunset sky of Los Angeles. Between those Hurricane bookends, Nebraska achieved success unlike any other college football team before or since.

Perhaps a downfall was inevitable. “Nebraska is not the first major college football dynasty to fall on tough times.” Chris Dufresne wrote in the Los Angeles Times in 2002. “Of the 10 winningest programs of all time, Nebraska is the only one that has avoided a downturn in the last 40 years.” The Huskers stood stubborn and defiant through the waves of change that lapped at the landscape around them for much of the 20th century. But while they staved off a downturn longer than their blue-blooded brethren, they haven’t yet recovered the way others have. The same question that’s lingered for the last twenty-two years remains: how does Nebraska return to its winning ways?

The playbook written by Devaney and Osborne is still viable. Though adaptation to today’s modern game is a foregone necessity, the same principles that guided Nebraska to unparalleled success before can do it again. The adherence to a ground game, the commitment to scouring the country for potential, and the willingness to be different and innovative. Big Red was at the forefront of strength and nutrition, of taking on academic risks, and of recruiting the players others wouldn’t.

It's those traits that made Nebraska historically consistent and, what Hall of Fame coach and adversary Bill Snyder called, the “epitome of college football.” It’s a near-simultaneous dissolution of those practices that fell them.

College football is replete with teams that have etched their names into the sport’s history, a consequence of its more than one hundred teams spanning over one hundred fifty years of play. But despite the abundance of stories and incredible feats, Nebraska’s consistent excellence for those forty years still stands the test of time as the most remarkable.

[[1] Merrill, Elizabeth. “NU football program fell short, Dukes says”
]2] Mark Bechtal, Sports Illustrated, August 12, 2002, WELCOME TO THE BIG TIME HERE'S WHAT STATE-OF-THE-ART FOOTBALL LOOKS LIKE AT THREE SCHOOLS
[3] McKewon, Sam. “Ten Triumphs of the Callahan Era.” Nov 14, 2007
[4] Cordes, Henry. “Unbeatable.” Page 323.
[5] STAFF EDITORIAL: “Solich deserves one more year”
[6] McKewon, Sam. “Bohl hits the highs after NU low point.”
[7] Omaha World Herald, September 16, 2009

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