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Analysis: How Seahawks Collapsed vs. Bears

Matty F. Brown explores exactly how the Seahawks gave away a victory in Week 16 versus the Bears.

Matty F. Brown

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At one point on Sunday, the Seahawks led the Bears, 17-7. Entering the fourth quarter, the scoreboard read 24-14 in favor of Seattle. 

And then, in disastrous fashion well-suited to their terrible 2021 season, the Seahawks melted into a sludgy mess and a 25-24 loss.

Seattle became the first team in 2021 to lose multiple games after leading by double digits in the fourth quarter, having also plummeted when hosting the Titans in Week 2. Unlike their picturesque surroundings, the Seahawks' Week 16 performance versus the Bears was not very Christmassy.

“It just snowballed on us in the fourth quarter,” head coach Pete Carroll told 710 ESPN Seattle the following Monday.

“Well that was about as disappointing a loss as we’ve had,” Carroll started post-game. “We were in control in so many ways in the game to go win it and we just never did, and let them stay alive and they found a way to make their plays.”

How did such an abominable catastrophe occur? Well, as Carroll described in the aftermath, “we had to do some stuff to give them that opportunity and they took advantage of it.” The Seahawks’ execution in all three phases—offense, defense and special teams—avalanched in the fourth quarter. It was the polar opposite of what a Carroll-led team aims to be.

The Big Sack Russell Wilson Took 

Following the defense registering back-to-back negative plays to hold Chicago to a field goal with 10:46 left in the fourth quarter, Seattle’s offense took control of the ball with a 24-17 lead. Wilson and company marched down the field on a 60-yard drive to the Bears’ eight-yard line with victory within reach.

Instead, Wilson was sacked on the 3rd and 5 play for a 12-yard loss, bringing up a 4th and 17 and lengthening the ensuing field goal attempt. The outcome of the play has provided plenty of comments from head coach and quarterback, which are especially interesting when contrasted with one another.

“That’s a situation right there that did give them a chance to shift it and the momentum of it,” Carroll said afterwards. “In that situation, that third down in field goal range to go up by 10, we gotta get rid of the football. We can’t take [a] sack there, and we gotta look at what happened on that play again."

“In that situation, the ball was down [in] the red zone, ball’s on the eight-yard line or so,” Wilson highlighted in his post-game presser. “I’ve been moving well for the most part for most of the day, so once it wasn’t there, you know, we’ve had so many scramble opportunities. I was looking for Tyler [Lockett] trying to see if he could move around and just try to get away and knowing that: ‘Okay, we’ll still be, no matter what, we’re going to be near field goal range. Obviously, we’re inside of it now.’

“And so, I think that the risk-reward, trying to score [a] touchdown, we’ve done it so many times. We’ve hit Tyler and other guys and unfortunately we weren’t able to make that play. And then obviously the situation happens where we don’t end up making it. But I was trying to play ball like I know how to do and always do and try to move around and just try to see if we can find a touchdown there, especially down in the red zone that close. It’s one of those things that if I can run it in there. If I can slide into the left, slide to the right, boom some guy [is] open [its a] touchdown. So, that was that situation.”

“You live by the sword, you die by the sword,” Carroll summarized of Wilson’s play-style to 710 ESPN Seattle on Monday, essentially agreeing with his quarterback’s “risk-reward” assessment. 

This line-of-thinking has some merit on the 3rd and 5 play. After all, it was reasonable for Wilson to treat the 3rd and 5 close to the goal line as a situation to play-make—even with the snow, you can expect the kicker to convert.

However, Wilson’s situational football should still be questioned. Remove hindsight from the equation. A process can be applied to this: There is little need to add risk when leading by a touchdown with eight minutes and 10 seconds left to play.

Indeed, it’s this thinking which helps explain why Wilson did not throw the football to the left stick route of Dee Eskridge. While a precise throw could have been completed, the risk was that the throw could have been jumped for an interception or even run back for six.

This method also means that, similarly, Wilson’s improvization attempt could have resulted in a forced fumble with the ball knocked out from Robert Quinn at the quarterback’s blindside. There was no need to attempt heroics in this game state.

Carroll was quick to add self-criticism after the game. 

“I got to get that done,” Carroll said. “I got to get him [Wilson] to execute that way. I got to get Russ to pull that off. I got to get the coaches to make sure we reminded him well enough so that that didn’t happen. That’s [when] you sail it out of the end zone right there, kick the field goal.” 

Should a 33-year old, $140 million quarterback need that coaching to get it right?

Moreover, Wilson executing the concept as designed would have brought fine results for the Seahawks. The quarterback scanned his primary stick route of Gerald Everett, which was a tight window. He then moved left, where DeeJay Dallas was open over the middle. If Wilson had hit his open checkdown, it would have brought Seattle very close to—if not past—the first down marker.

“He knows that that’s one of those situations, but he’s looking to extend it,” Carroll told 710 ESPN Seattle. “Part of the thing, you know, that was a quick game, you know? It was a three-step drop route and, you know, those, generally, we kind of teach those are the chance, if you don’t have it, you gotta get rid of the football ‘cause you’re more vulnerable to being sacked because you’re closer to the rush.”

The frustration of  Duane Brown afterwards was visible. Offensive linemen do not like their quarterback getting sacked. They were pass protecting for the ball to be out fast. The unit gave Wilson the time to full field read in the quick concept. And yet the quarterback’s improvization collapsed the protection. 

The Missed Field Goal

We are not, obviously, discussing the sack in such detail if Jason Myers had converted his 39-yard field goal. This is a fact the kicker himself made sure to point out on Twitter: 

Chicago took over at its 29-yard line with seven minutes and 18 seconds on the clock, needing a touchdown to tie the game.

The Offense’s Failure to Finish

What should have been a decisive moment in the game arrived next: the defense stopped the Bears at 4th and 4 and the Seahawks' offense gained possession at the Chicago 46-yard line with five minutes and one second of game left to play.

“We missed a field goal, then the defense goes out and gets a nice stop, and then we get the ball back for our guys at midfield on a fourth down stop,” Carroll evaluated in his Monday media appearance. "We need to capitalize on that with the offense with everybody taking advantage of that."

After the attack picked up a first down, Colby Parkinson’s 2nd and 8 holding penalty at Chicago’s 28-yard line pushed Seattle out of traditional field goal range, bringing up a 2nd and 18 with three minutes and 16 seconds remaining.

Eskridge’s fly sweep was then stuffed for a loss of three yards with the playside cornerback unblocked after the edge-setting of Trevis Gipson demanded two blocks, from Everett and Travis Homer. The Bears took their first timeout prior to the 3rd and 21, stopping the clock at three minutes and seven seconds.

The Seattle offense called an all-slants passing play in the drain-clock scenario. Shane Waldron may have been trying to get the Seahawks back into field goal range from the Chicago 41. Wilson’s target of Freddie Swain was at the 34-yard line, which would have meant a 51-yard field goal.

However, the low pass was knocked out of Swain's grasp by the breaking man coverage defender and fell incomplete, meaning the clock was stopped with Chicago keeping two timeouts. A run play would likely have taken longer to develop than the four-second pass. Furthermore, the Bears would have been left with one timeout or roughly two minutes and 20 seconds on the play-clock with two timeouts.

The All-Pro's Bad Punt

Pro Bowl snub Michael Dickson contributed to the lack of execution with his punt from Chicago’s 41-yard line, after Bears head coach Matt Nagy declined the delay of game penalty. Dickson’s rare mistake was kicking a touchback, meaning that Seattle handed the ball back to Chicago at its 20-yard line—a paltry gain in field position of just 21 yards.

The Defense's Failure to Finish

On the following drive, the defense joined the offense at the failure-to-finish party. Chicago gained possession with two minutes and 56 seconds and two timeouts to play with. The opening play from the defense was a disaster; a 45-yarder that took the Bears to the Seahawks’ 35-yard line in just 10 seconds.

Seattle played man-to-man defense that was revealed pre-snap by Chicago aligning tight end Graham out wide. Darnell Mooney beat Ugo Amadi’s one-on-one with a deep curl route. Mooney caught the ball just past the first down marker, then managed to break the tackles of Amadi and Ryan Neal before driving through Quandre Diggs and John Reid for 30 yards.

Another 15 yards were added when Darrell Taylor’s inside move saw his elbow connect with the face of Nick Foles after the ball had been thrown.

After allowing some dunks underneath their coverage, the Seahawks managed to generate back-to-back negative plays defending their red zone and faced 3rd and 14. Unfortunately, they allowed a touchdown on the play.

“They did the right thing, right at the end there, going on John [Reid],” Carroll described post-game. “And we had zone on him, we kinda knew it was coming, but Jimmy made a nice play and you got to give him credit. Great throw too.” 

Seattle played Cover 4 and essentially got Reid and Neal over Graham at the catch point. Yet, Graham is 6-foot-7 and Reid is 5-foot-10. There was no defense for this well-executed mismatch.

The throw from Foles was beautiful also. 

“You know he kinda did what Nick does, you know what I mean? He makes plays and he came through for them,” Carroll praised of the Bears quarterback afterwards. “He has been a playmaker throughout his career and he did it today. The throw to Jimmy and the throw on the two-point conversion was ridiculously perfect.”

The successful, pivotal two-point attempt was aided by a crazy catch from Damiere Byrd in a clustered, narrowed window.

“What happens is there’s an area where we get a hold on the line of scrimmage, and then we get a late hit on the quarterback, and then there’s a guy that is laying off in his coverage when he’s supposed to press him,” Carroll described on Monday of the series of events. “Just things like that that you just try to keep working to clean up that seem to, they get magnified in these games that are so close. I mean, you know, a mistake, an issue, a choice a guy may make in a situation.”

The Amateur End

Only needing a field goal to still win, the Seahawks began their last drive at their 27-yard line with 53 seconds and two timeouts left. Things quickly went wrong, with Ethan Pocic called for a 2nd and 6 holding penalty.

The Seahawks managed to claw their way back to 4th and 1 at their own 36-yard line with one timeout left. Yet they could not prevent their basic execution errors, with Everett false-starting to put the offense back to a much more difficult 4th and 6.

Wilson’s scramble short of the sticks coming back on off-setting penalties only lengthened the pain. The offensive line had performed well in the game. However, on the last play, Jake Curhan was beat rapidly by Bruce Irvin’s inside move in an exit game and the quarterback’s pass on the run fell out of Lockett's reach on the crossing route.

The Aftermath

When it mattered, Foles played stronger situational football than Wilson and made some baller plays. However, Seattle’s choke job extended to all three phases failing to play. It was the performance of a bad team. This has naturally led to questions around Carroll’s future as Seahawks head coach.

“I’m taking it the other way,” Carroll assessed post-game, adding some familiar comments. “I’m taking it like I need to do better. I’m not calling [out] the players for not responding. I have to respond better. I’ve got to do more for them and help them more so. Maybe that’s a coach’s ego or whatever. But I don’t mind holding myself in that kind of accountability. I’ve just got to find a way. I’m expecting our other coaches and the players to do the same thing. Everybody gives everything they have to give us every shot to be as good as we can possibly be. And it starts with me.

“I feel like I have to do more, I have to. I feel in a time like this, I feel like I got to find ways to help our guys more so that we don’t get in the situation where we can give them a chance. And that’s what I’m doing, I’m going to try to figure out how I can help and get us cleaner right down the stretch and win the football game and not give something up and the penalty that we get and all that kind of stuff. We’ve got things that we can do better. We gotta do better and I’m asking them to do the same thing.”

Week 16 was not the first time Seattle has collapsed, not the first time Carroll said he had to do better and not the first time Carroll has lost 10 games—2021 will be Carroll’s first 10-loss season as a coach in 27 years, since his single season with the Jets in 1994. 

Sunday’s loss cemented Seattle’s 2021 status as the last-placed team in the NFC West, a spot they had managed to avoid since entering the division in 2002. Looking forward, then, a positive to Sunday's defeat is that it is likelier to enact the real change that many Seahawks fans now desire. 

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Matty F. Brown
MATTY F. BROWN

Based and born in the UK, Matty has coached football for over 5 years, including stints as a scout, defensive coordinator, and Wide Receiver/DB Coach. Asides from an Xs and Os obsession, he enjoys: other sports; eating out; plus following Newcastle United. He graduated from the University of East Anglia in 2018 with a BA in Modern History.

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