The Unintended Consequences of Removing Saddam: How Toppling Dictators Strengthened Iran and Fueled Extremism
In my conversation with John McPhee, we explored the unintended consequences that followed the removal of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, leaders whose downfall left a vacuum that continues to shape the Middle East. While both men ruled with brutality, their presence kept a kind of order in the region, especially with regard to Iran. Saddam, in particular, acted as a counterweight to Iranian influence, maintaining a delicate balance of power. But once he was removed, that balance crumbled, and Iran began to exert greater influence across the Middle East. In the process, we saw the rise of extremist groups like al-Qaeda, exploiting the power vacuum left by his fall.
The concept of “the devil you know” rings true here. Despite Saddam’s ruthlessness, his removal unleashed a wave of chaos that gave rise to new, uncontainable threats. Similar chaos unfolded in Libya after Gaddafi’s ouster, where we saw the rapid spread of extremist factions that further destabilized North Africa. These cases highlight the complex reality of regime change in regions where ideological and sectarian conflicts run deep. Removing a dictator is one thing; replacing him with stability is an entirely different challenge.
Another critical point we touched on was the American approach to counterinsurgency, built around the strategy of winning “hearts and minds.” On paper, this approach sounds idealistic and noble, but in practice, it only works to a limited extent. Counterinsurgency requires not just trust-building but a relentless ability to neutralize threats. The U.S. was perhaps too focused on the softer side of counterinsurgency without fully embracing the lethal force sometimes required to root out deeply entrenched ideologies. Winning “hearts and minds” has its place, but relying on it alone is like trying to patch a dam with duct tape, it may hold temporarily, but it’s not a sustainable solution when dealing with ideological insurgencies that span generations.
One of the biggest missed opportunities was the inability to eliminate safe havens, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. This rugged border area became a sanctuary for fighters who could retreat there, knowing full well that the U.S. couldn’t follow. Fighters would cross into Afghanistan to strike, then retreat back into Pakistan, making it nearly impossible to deliver a decisive blow. Pakistan, for its part, was either unwilling or unable to do anything substantial about it, creating a revolving door of insurgent activity. This limitation in America’s strategy allowed extremist groups to regroup and re-arm, dragging out the conflict and creating further instability.
Reflecting on these lessons, it’s clear that America was unprepared for the complexities of the Middle East. The region is steeped in ideological and historical grievances that don’t align easily with Western ideas of democracy or governance. While winning hearts and minds may be achievable on a small scale, it doesn’t address the root causes or ideological divides that drive many of the conflicts in the Middle East. And while some progress has been made since the immediate post-9/11 years, the reality is that much of the region is still far from embracing American values.
At the heart of it all lies Iran—a country that continues to fuel instability, supporting various factions across the Middle East to further its influence. As John noted, Iran is like a “cancer” in the region, a force of instability that needs to be checked for any real peace to take hold. The empowerment of Iran post-Saddam is perhaps one of the most significant unintended consequences of the Iraq invasion. With Iraq no longer serving as a counterweight, Iran’s influence has grown unchecked, from its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon to its involvement in Syria and Yemen. This rise has transformed Iran into a regional powerhouse, exerting influence in a way that not only threatens its neighbors but also reshapes the entire geopolitical landscape.
In hindsight, it’s clear that removing regimes without a well-thought-out plan for what comes next can be a double-edged sword. The power vacuums left behind aren’t filled by stable democracies; they’re often filled by extremist factions, opportunistic regimes, and other actors who make the region even more volatile. This lesson underscores the need for a more comprehensive approach to foreign policy and military strategy, one that considers not just the immediate goal of toppling a dictator but the long-term impact on the entire region.
The complexity of the Middle East defies quick fixes and demands a strategic patience that acknowledges the deep-rooted issues at play. As we’ve seen, removing a leader like Saddam may solve one problem but creates a cascade of others. The U.S. approach needs to account for the regional balance of power, the role of ideological factions, and the possibility that Western ideals may not easily take root. Without these considerations, interventions may end up creating more problems than they solve.
Ultimately, the Middle East remains a challenging landscape, with Iran at the center of much of the ongoing instability. Until that influence is addressed, true peace and stability in the region will remain elusive.